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Abstract
Acquirers’ Value Creation in Green M&A Deals
This thesis seeks to investigate acquirers’ post-acquisition performance when buying a "green"
company, looking specifically at differences between North America and Europe. I conduct
cross-sectional OLS analyses on 423 deals in North America and Europe, between 2000 and
2016, focusing on accounting-based performance measures. My results suggest acquirers are
better off buying a green company in North America rather than Europe, despite having to pay
higher transaction premiums for companies with lower average ESG scores across the pond.
However, my findings fail to confirm previous research that acquiring green companies creates
value for bidders in the first place.
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1 Introduction
In this study, I examine the effects of "green" M&A transactions. As the world is increasingly
focusing on sustainability and social impact, environmental, social and governance (ESG) issues
become more and more important for companies as well. In 2018, 83% of S&P 500 companies
issued reports on sustainability, compared with only 20% in 2011 (Kwon et al., 2018). The
area of interest that is sustainable investing is starting to manifest itself in stock returns as well.
Renshaw (2018) shows that companies with improving ESG credentials have outperformed their
benchmarks by between 0.81% and 2.43% from 2015 to 2018.
Social investing is on the rise and billions of dollars are flowing into "green-only" funds.
Morningstar reports that average annual net inflows to sustainability funds between 2013 and
2018 were 30x times higher than from 2009 to 2012 (Morningstar, 2019). New assets invested
into mutual funds and ETFs focusing on ESG totalled USD 20.6 billion in 2019, a year-on-year
increase of 275% from the previous USD 5.5 billion high in 2018. Many companies want to
get in on this hype and reap the rewards of a greener label, and one of the ways of doing so is
to acquire a green company − but does this lead to improved performance and better results?
My thesis aims at answering this question, and further to provide a comparison between the two
geographical regions that have historically dominated the green M&A market.
I contribute to the existing literature by relating the size of the deal to that of the acquirer, in
addition to adding three years of observations. I also focus more on green deals in detail using
several performance measures, and highlight differences between North America and Europe.
My sample does not confirm existing research that acquiring green firms creates value for bidders,
but my findings do indicate that acquiring a green target in North America is more beneficial
than Europe − but this is only statistically significant in certain scenarios and thus not definitive.
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2 Literature Review
This section is centred around a review of relevant research previously conducted on theoretical
concepts related to my topic of "green" M&As. First, I look at what makes certain companies
"green"; the label which is placed on companies focusing on energy transition and clean
technology. Then, I provide an overview of M&As, the reasoning behind them and how their
performance is best measured. Subsequently, I investigate the main economic and structural
differences between North America and Europe, before I in Section 3 highlight research papers
that have looked specifically at topics similar to my thesis in the past.
2.1 Green energy transition and clean technology
Salvi et al. (2018) defines green growth as "a novel type of economic growth and development
that ensures natural assets continue to provide resources and environmental services key for
the wellbeing of future generations". The "green" label is an umbrella which covers terms
like "Corporate Social Responsibility" (CSR), "Environmental, Social and Governance" (ESG),
"renewable energy" and "cleantech". CSR and ESG are abbreviations that are used fairly
interchangeably today, both referring to the idea that companies are responsible for all their
stakeholders (e.g. employees, local communities and the environment), and not just their
shareholders (Doh and Guay, 2006). Ellabban et al. (2014) define renewable energy as energy
from resources that are replenished during a human life (e.g. solar, wind and water). Cleantech
is a compounding of "clean" and "technology", a sector which was born at the start of the
year 2000 (Caprotti, 2011), and aims to deliver value with a limited or non-existent use of
non-renewable resources, thus creating less waste than conventional alternatives (Pernick and
Wilder, 2007). Together, I argue that the aforementioned explanations accurately define the term
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"green". However, for variation and simplicity, terms like "cleantech", "green", "ESG", "CSR"
and "renewable energy" will be used throughout this thesis in reference to companies involved in
green activities. The same logic applies to terms like "merger", "acquisition" and "takeover" in
referring to the combination of two companies.
The focus on ESG has intensified in recent years, but researchers have looked for a relationship
between an environmental and social focus, and financial performance since the 1970s (Friede et
al., 2015). Friede and his colleagues review about 2,200 individual studies on the relationship
between ESG and corporate financial performance, and find a non-negative relationship in
roughly 90% of them, with the large majority reporting positive findings. According to their
findings, focusing on ESG usually enhances performance, and at the very least does not hurt it.
It would seem then, that companies have little to lose in terms of financial performance by
focusing more on ESG and becoming more green. In early 2019, IHS Markit (2019) surveyed
senior executives at private equity firms, large corporations and asset management firms, asking
for their thoughts on ESG’s place in M&A going forward. 53% answered that ESG factors will
become significantly more important in 2019 to 2021, with no one believing ESG factors would
lose any importance. Such predictions may help explain why the number of green M&A deals is
increasing (Salvi et al., 2018).
2.2 Mergers and Acquisitions
Growth is among the two main reasons for companies to merge, according to Gaughan (2017).
Growth comes naturally as a result of an acquisition, but green companies can accelerate this
as consumers are increasingly focused on sustainability issues, allowing for opportunities of
high rate of return (Salvi et al., 2018). This is appealing to companies, as keeping assets from
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being depleted will make them last longer. Gaughan (2017) also highlights the importance of
synergies, which can be split into operational and financial. Operational synergies are to a large
extent related to improving margins by increasing revenues (e.g. higher pricing power), and/or
reducing costs (e.g. lower unit costs following economies of scale).
Financial synergies are typically the reduction of the entity’s cost of capital. Financial synergies,
with regard to green companies, have been thoroughly researched by among others Sharfman and
Fernando (2008), Ghoul et al. (2011) and Ng and Rezaee (2015). They find a clear relationship
between a firm’s environmental focus and its cost of capital. More specifically, they find that
firms focusing more on environmental and governance aspects reduce their cost of equity and
can shift from equity to debt financing (subsequently obtaining higher tax benefits). With several
investment banks (e.g. JP Morgan Chase and Goldman Sachs) now imposing stricter constraints
related to sustainability in terms of what they will help finance, the relative lower cost of capital
for ESG-focused companies can become even more substantial going forward.
2.3 Performance measures
M&As in general have been extensively researched, with consensus being that sellers capture
the majority of value creation − leaving little to nothing for the buyers. This usually materializes
through bidders paying a premium to target shareholders in order to obtain control, thus
generating a positive return for the sellers (Jensen & Ruback, 1983). There is no clear consensus
on the opposing side, however, and whether bidders experience value creation or destruction
is heavily debated. There are two main reasons for this; it is difficult to decide both what to
measure, and how to measure it. One could argue for measuring share price performance, sales
and market performance, or profitability performance. All of these will say something about
value creation, but often with different results. This is especially true when combining it with
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the vast number of different ways there are to measure performance. Studies have utilised
accounting-based measures such as Return On Assets (ROA), Return On Equity (ROE) and
Return On Sales (ROS), as well as market-based measures like Tobin’s Q and Jensen’s α −
yielding different and sometimes conflicting results (Zollo & Meier, 2008).
In determining "value creation", most of the literature focuses on stock market reactions (Cording
et al., 2010). This can either be done through the event study methodology (short term) or long-
term stock market performance. These differ in terms of time horizon, but both reflect investors’
expectations of future returns. This in turn assumes that investors act rationally and have the
necessary information available to accurately assess future cash flows. The assumption of
rationality is a strong one, and has been questioned by several scholars (e.g. Bromiley et al.,
1988).
To avoid the assumption of rationality, I make use of accounting-based performance measures, to
investigate if there is fundamental value creation taking place for acquirers of green companies
− and how it may differ between North America and Europe. Cording et al. (2010) argue
that the most common method is to use changes in ROE, ROS or ROA, from one year before
the acquisition to two-to-three years after. Change in accounting-based performance measures
has the advantage of reflecting actual returns earned by the firm, and allowing for enough time
so that operational synergies can be achieved. In addition, both private and public companies
can in theory be included as one is no longer bound by public stock market information. The
drawbacks of this methodology are that the longer time horizon means that other factors not
related to the acquisition can affect the results (which is also the case with long-term stock
market performance), and that management can manipulate accounting figures (Chakravarthy,
1986).
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2.4 Economic and structural differences between North
America and Europe
For simplicity, I focus on the United States as a proxy for all of North America in this chapter,
as this is by far the largest and most influential economy in the region. The United States and
Europe (in aggregate) are two economies of similar size in terms of GDP. The IMF (2019)
estimates both regions to have a total GDP of approximately USD 22 trillion in 2018. But to
some extent, the similarities end there. Europe has more than twice as many people as the United
States, and consists of 44 countries. Brounen et al. (2004) conclude that "the US and European
financial markets and firms differ considerably". They justify this statement by referring to
several studies conducted on the structural differences between the United States and Europe.
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that the financial system in Europe is more dependent on
institutions and relationships, while a market-based system is more prominent in the United
States. The characteristics of the financial systems have also manifested themselves in how
corporations finance their activities. A bank-lending model prevails in Europe, where bank loans
account for 80% of corporate financing and only 10% stems from debt raised in the market (Le
Leslé, 2012). The latter figure compares to 60% in the United States.
Chew (1997) shows that the relationship-based system in Europe also extends to the corporate
governance system practiced. Brounen et al. (2004) add to this that shareholder orientation is
more prevalent in Anglo-Saxon countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, while
this is less important in continental Europe. Such shareholder orientation and legal protection
are major determinants of the size and success of a country’s capital markets, according to La
Porta et al. (1997). They argue that the focus on protecting shareholders in countries following
English common law (e.g. the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada), explains why
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these countries have larger and more developed capital markets than continental Europe.
Doh and Guay (2006) investigate how the structural differences between the United States and
Europe affect focus on CSR, and conclude that awareness of, and support for, CSR is more
advanced in Europe. This is echoed by Nordea Markets, which calculates the average ESG score
per region for North America and Europe based on MSCI data, and finds that the average ESG
score of European companies outperformed North American ones in a range of 20% to 50%
between 2005 and 2017 (Nordea Markets, 2018).
Common for the two continents is that bidders pay an extensive premium when acquiring
companies, and that this premium increases in cross-boarder transactions (Mateev and Andonov,
2017). Historically, target companies involved in M&A transactions in North America have
earned a higher abnormal return following the announcement, compared to Europe (Renneboog,
2006). Past research thus suggests that companies acquiring a target in North America are paying
a higher price premium in M&A transactions, especially if the acquirer is not domestic, and that
the ESG focus in North America is less advanced than in Europe. However, the higher price
premium paid in M&A transactions in North America relative to Europe can still be beneficial
for acquirers if there is also a positive difference in their post-acquisition performance. In this
thesis, I address whether or not this is actually the case for green M&As.
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3 Hypothesis
In this section, I review research previously conducted on similar topics related to acquirers’
performance after M&A transactions in North America and Europe (with an emphasis on those
involving green companies), and develop my hypotheses accordingly. As discussed in Chapter
2.3, there is no definitive consensus with respects to post-acquisition performance for bidders.
Using different performance measures, including accounting and market-based measures, have
yielded different results for different researchers (Bettinazzi and Zollo, 2017). With regards to
abnormal returns for M&As in general, the majority of studies indicates negative post-acquisition
performance for acquirers (though not statistically significant), in both the United States (Andrade
et al., 2001) and Europe (Campa and Hernando, 2004).
When focusing on renewable energy and cleantech M&As in detail, the picture changes somewhat.
While not nearly as much research has been conducted in this niche, the results mainly point
to the opposite of M&As in general; namely that acquirers experience positive post-acquisition
performance when acquiring a green company. Eisenbach et al. (2011) examine 337 M&A
transactions from 2000 to 2009 in which the target was in the renewable energy sector. Using
the event study methodology, they find that acquirers earned positive abnormal returns when
acquiring a renewable company. The same result is echoed by Basse-Mama et al. (2013) and
Yoo et al. (2013), who both add that the positive post-acquisition effects are larger for acquirers
that are also renewable firms (homogeneous), than for non-renewable acquirers (heterogeneous).
They argue that the operational synergies and increased market power gained by homogeneous
firms thus trump the diversification effect heterogeneous firms can achieve.
Salvi et al. (2018) also research green M&As and their effects on acquirers’ performance, but
they use an accounting-based performance measure (ROA). Examining mega deals (larger than
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USD 2 billion) from 2000 to 2013, they find that while acquirers in general exhibit a negative
post-acquisition change in ROA, this turned positive if the target is classified as a green company.
This is despite the fact that, or perhaps the reason for why, acquirers are willing to pay a larger
premium to acquire targets with superior CSR and ESG management (Salvi et al., 2018).
Based on the aforementioned studies and literature review, I arrive at my hypotheses. The findings
by Eisenbach et al. (2011) regarding acquirers’ positive market performance after buying a green
company, suggest investors are on average positive to green transactions. According to Cording
et al. (2010), a positive market reaction reflects expectations of improved future returns, which
can be expected to be found in future accounting information:
H1: Acquirers in green M&A transactions exhibit a positive change in post-acquisition
performance based on accounting-based measures
Further, the transaction premiums paid in M&As in North America are higher than in Europe
(Renneboog, 2006). A willingness to consistently pay higher premiums may suggest that
acquirers buying a company in North America have higher expectations for, and realizations of,
changes in post-acquisition performance, relative to those targeting firms in Europe. This is in
turn something I expect remains the case for my sample of green deals as well:
H2: The positive change in post-acquisition performance for acquirers in green M&A deals
is larger for acquirers that are buying a target in North America compared to Europe
While M&As in general have been extensively researched, consensus around bidders’ value
creation is still lacking. Further, combining this with a focus on green companies opens up a new,
fairly unexplored area of research. An environmental focus will likely become more important
in the future, and green M&As are therefore a highly relevant topic where additional research is
needed.
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4 Data and Sample Selection
I use the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum M&A Database to find deals, as this is recognized
as a highly reliable source of information regarding M&A transactions (Barnes et al., 2014).
Subsequent accounting and financial information for the selected companies are obtained from
Thomson Reuters EIKON by matching Datastream Codes. "Green" deals are sourced for by
employing a search for 60 keywords in the target’s detailed business description (e.g. "cleantech",
"green", "solar" etc. − see Appendix A1), as suggested by Zephyr (2013).
More specifically, I gather data from North America and Europe, as these have historically been
the largest markets for green M&A deals and are the focus of my thesis. Thanos and Papadakis
(2012) find that studying the acquiring firms is most common in the literature, and therefore
argue that more research is needed for target firms. However, as the authors mention; it is difficult
to obtain data for target firms. They are often small, private companies without detailed public
information, and may even seize to exist in their original state after the acquisition. This is the
case with my sample as well, forcing me to investigate the performance of acquiring firms. A
similar hinder in obtaining data also leads me to look exclusively at publicly listed acquirers, as
information for private ones is difficult to obtain.
I study the change in accounting figures from one year before the acquisition to three years after
the deal, in line with Salvi et al. (2018), meaning I am only able to use deals up to 31.12.2016.
In order to account for deals completed in different economic environments, I include the period
before the financial crisis (from 2000 to 2016 in total). I exclude observations where the buyer is
a financial institution (fund or investor), as there are no operational gains in such a case. Another
requirement is that the acquirer needs to own more than 50% of the target post acquisition (Salvi
et al,. 2018). I am interested in observing the effects on the acquirer’s returns when it controls
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the target, and this will ensure that the bidder have control of the target’s operations after the
acquisition and thus can be held accountable for its performance. The deal value is required to
be a minimum of 1% of the acquirer’s average market capitalization in the four weeks prior to
announcement, in order to make sure the deal is of significant importance to the buyer (Hu et
al., 2020). To ensure reliable data, the constraint of being publicly listed is, as mentioned, also
imposed on acquirers. In addition, deal status is required to be "completed".
1. Markets: North America and Europe
2. Time period: 01.01.2000 to 31.12.2016
3. Acquirer: Publicly listed, not financial institution
4. Acquirer’s ownership after acquisition: Minimum 50.1%
5. Deal status: Completed
6. Deal value: Minimum 1% of acquirer’s market capitalization (average in the four weeks
leading up to the announcement)
7. Deal type: All mergers and acquisitions
8. Target status: "Green" (see Appendix A1)
9. Non-missing values for all variables
The larger the deal value is as a percentage of the acquirer’s market capitalization, the fewer
deals remain in the sample. After eliminating deals where financial data was lacking, the total
number of deals left is 423 for the 1% sample. Corresponding numbers are 311 and 222 for a 5%
sample and 10% sample, respectively. As the results that are highlighted later remain consistent
across all three samples, I elect to focus on the 1% sample as this is in line with previous research
(Hu et al., 2020) and yields as many deals as possible. All samples remain fairly consistently
split 60% and 40% between North America and Europe, respectively.
Table 1: Number of deals by geography
1% sample 5% sample 10% sample
North America 254 (60%) 187 (60%) 137 (62%)
Europe 169 (40%) 124 (40%) 85 (38%)
Total 423 (100%) 311 (100%) 222 (100%)
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5 Methodology
The structure of my research is inspired by Salvi et al. (2018). However, their focus is centered
around the difference between green and non-green mega-deals (larger than USD 2 billion),
from 2000 to 2013. Rather than having a fixed cut-off point, I relate the deal value to the size
of the acquirer, as this will ensure that the deal is material for the buyer (Hu et al., 2020). My
contribution to the literature also lies in focusing more specifically on the green deals than Salvi
et al. (2018), and on the continent-specifics of North America and Europe. I am also able to
extend the time period with an additional three years to 2016, a period in which the focus on
green companies, and the money in green-only funds, have become even larger. Salvi and his
colleagues use as their performance measure change in ROA from one year before the acquisition
to two and three years after. ROA is recognized as one of the most reliable performance measures
in M&A literature (e.g. Cording et al., 2010 and King et al., 2004). I keep this as a performance
measure, but also added ROE, ROS and Return On Capital Employed (ROCE).
As mentioned in Chapter 2.3 about performance measures, there is no clear consensus about how
to best measure post-acquisition performance. According to Aggarwal and Garg (2019), ROE
and ROCE should be added as performance measures due to the vital importance of returning
value to shareholders and debtholders. They argue that unless an M&A transaction improves
the profitability position of the acquirer, it cannot be deemed a success. ROS is among the most
common performance measures (Cording et al., 2010), and reflects operational performance and
synergies that may arise from an acquisition. Thanos and Papadakis (2010) argue that the insight
into M&A performance can be improved by including several accounting-based measures, and
for this reason I choose to include ROE, ROCE and ROS, in addition to ROA.
I use OLS regressions to investigate the difference in acquirers’ post-acquisition performance
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between North America and Europe. In accordance with the suggestion of Thanos and Papadakis
(2010) to include several accounting-based measures, I elect to focus on changes in the dependent
variables ROA, ROE, ROS and ROCE. These changes will be measured from one year before
the transaction (t-1) to three years after (t+3), as suggested by Zollo and Singh (2004). ROA and
ROE is calculated as net profit divided by total assets and shareholders’ equity, respectively. ROS
is equivalent to operating margin (operating income divided by revenues). ROCE is calculated as
EBIT divided by capital employed (total assets − current liabilities). The dependent variables all
lag the independent variables, as the latter are calculated at the time of the acquisition.
As mentioned, my hypotheses are that acquirers in green M&A deals exhibit positive post-
acquisition performance (H1), and that this performance is better when the target is incorporated
in North America (H2). As such, I focus on the independent variable “NA”; a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the target is incorporated in North America, and 0 otherwise.
Cording et al. (2010) look at 218 control variables used by researchers in the M&A literature,
and find that the ones most often used relate to deal and firm-specific characteristics. I choose
four deal characteristic variables and two firm-specific variables, in accordance with Salvi et al.
(2018). "SS" is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the target and acquirer are registered
in the same "Industry Group", defined as having the same first three digits in their SIC code
(Bhojraj et al., 2003), and 0 otherwise. "CC" is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1
if the target and acquirer are incorporated in different countries, and 0 otherwise. The natural
logarithm of the deal value ("ln(DV )") is also included, as well as "Cash"; a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if the deal is paid for purely in cash, and 0 otherwise. The two firm-specific
variables are the natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets ("ln(TA)"), and the leverage of
the acquiring company ("Lev"), defined as total liabilities divided by shareholders’ equity.
∆ in per f ormance = α +β1NA+β2SS+β3CC+β4 ln(DV )+β5Cash+β6 ln(TA)+β7Lev+ ε (5.1)
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I conduct Ramsey’s regression specification tests for all four regressions, which yield p values above 5%.
Thus, the null hypothesis that the models are correctly specified cannot be rejected (Wooldridge, 2013).
As with a lot of financial datasets, my sample also has outliers. Adams et al. (2018) review 3,572 studies
published in the top four financial journals from 2008 to 2017, and find that 999 of them mention outliers.
Of those, 52% use winsorizing to cope with the effects outliers create. Investigation of the outliers in my
dataset reveals that most are likely data entry errors. According to Leone et al. (2017), winsorizing helps
to remove the effects of these observations. As such, I opt to follow the majority of scientific research in
the field of finance, and winsorize the data to [2.5% , 97.5%].
Table 2: Description of variables
Variable Symbol Description
Dependent variables
Change in ROAt-1 → t+3 ∆ROA
Change in acquirer’s ROA (net profit / total assets)
from one year before the deal to three years after
Change in ROEt-1 → t+3 ∆ROE
Change in acquirer’s ROE (net profit / shareholders’
equity) from one year before the deal to three years
after
Change in ROSt-1 → t+3 ∆ROS
Change in acquirer’s ROS (operating profit / revenues)
from one year before the deal to three years after
Change in ROCEt-1 → t+3 ∆ROCE
Change in acquirer’s ROCE (EBIT / capital employed)
from one year before the deal to three years after
Independent variable
North America NA
Dummy variable equal to 1 if target is incorporated in
North America, and 0 otherwise
Control variables
Homogeneity SS
Dummy variable equal to 1 if target and acquirer
operate in the same sector, and 0 otherwise
Cross-country CC
Dummy variable equal to 1 if target and acquirer are
incorporated in different countries, and 0 otherwise
Natural logarithm of deal
value
ln(DV ) Natural logarithm of deal value
Cash Cash
Dummy variable equal to 1 if method of payment is
purely cash, and 0 otherwise
Natural logarithm of total
assets
ln(TA)
Natural logarithm of acquirer’s total assets, as a
measure of firm size
Leverage Lev
Total liabilities divided by shareholders’ equity, as a
measure of acquirer’s leverage
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6 Results
Table 3 depicts descriptive statistics for the utilized variables. 60% of transactions occur with the
target incorporated in North America, while 51% are between companies operating in the same
sector. 32% of deals are cross-boarder transactions, and 39% is paid purely in cash. Averages of
the dependent variables are positive for ∆ROA (1 percentage point) and ∆ROS (9 percentage
points), and negative for ∆ROE (−4 percentage points) and ∆ROCE (−5 percentage points).
Table 3: Descriptive statistics in aggregate
Statistic ∆ROA ∆ROE ∆ROS ∆ROCE NA SS CC ln(DV) Cash ln(TA) Lev
N 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 423 423
Mean 0.01 −0.04 0.09 −0.05 0.60 0.51 0.32 4.06 0.39 6.25 1.46
Median −0.01 −0.03 −0.003 −0.02 1 1 0 4.08 0 6.27 1.09
St. Dev. 0.17 0.29 0.35 0.29 0.49 0.50 0.47 2.22 0.49 2.58 1.41
Min −0.31 −0.74 −0.25 −0.87 0 0 0 −1.35 0 −2.30 0.01
Max 0.52 0.66 1.30 0.60 1 1 1 11.04 1 12.67 5.44
Table 4 shows the averages of each variable by year. The average number of deals each year is 25
and the trend is that the number of green deals that fit the criteria from Section 4 has increased in
recent years. Interestingly, all average returns are positive for deals that occurred in 2014 to 2016.
This is the period I am able to extent to the study conducted by Salvi et al. (2018), and also a
period when inflows to ESG funds have increased substantially (Morningstar, 2019). Another
interesting observation is that yearly averages of ∆ROE and ∆ROCE follow an almost identical
pattern (with the exception of 2003), and that averages of ∆ROS is positive every year from
2002. Despite conflicting results, my initial findings do, to some extent, appear to contradict the
conclusions of the literature that M&A transactions destroy value for acquirers (e.g. King et al.,
2004, and Zollo and Meier, 2008). In fact, my results appear to be more in line with those of
Salvi et al. (2018), who find that while M&As in general may destroy value for bidders, the
green sub-sample outperformed the non-green one with respect to ∆ROA. However, a more
detailed analysis is needed before any conclusions can be drawn.
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Table 4: Averages of the variables by year
Year M&As ∆ROA ∆ROE ∆ROS ∆ROCE NA SS CC ln(DV) Cash ln(TA) Lev
2000 4 −0.04 −0.10 −0.01 −0.06 1.00 1.00 0.00 3.63 0.25 4.72 0.69
2001 4 −0.12 −0.39 −0.20 −0.35 0.75 0.25 0.00 2.83 0.25 4.53 0.80
2002 11 0.05 0.11 0.28 0.05 0.82 0.55 0.27 3.90 0.45 6.00 1.67
2003 12 0.03 0.02 0.17 −0.04 0.83 0.33 0.17 2.34 0.25 4.72 0.82
2004 7 −0.02 −0.06 0.04 −0.12 0.86 0.14 0.14 3.49 0.43 5.71 0.76
2005 12 −0.07 −0.04 0.12 −0.15 0.75 0.50 0.08 3.87 0.33 5.83 1.59
2006 30 0.03 −0.15 0.08 −0.11 0.40 0.63 0.33 4.21 0.33 5.23 1.54
2007 39 −0.04 −0.11 0.09 −0.13 0.49 0.59 0.46 4.43 0.54 6.64 1.03
2008 38 0.02 −0.02 0.18 −0.05 0.58 0.50 0.24 3.36 0.37 5.74 1.65
2009 34 0.02 −0.04 0.02 −0.05 0.74 0.56 0.26 3.92 0.38 6.47 1.72
2010 43 0.05 −0.00 0.09 −0.09 0.47 0.58 0.35 3.57 0.35 5.73 1.36
2011 35 −0.02 −0.02 0.02 −0.04 0.54 0.63 0.40 4.96 0.31 7.65 1.77
2012 32 −0.03 −0.09 0.03 −0.00 0.72 0.47 0.34 3.80 0.50 6.26 1.45
2013 34 −0.02 −0.08 0.05 −0.03 0.68 0.38 0.38 3.75 0.38 6.35 1.93
2014 51 0.04 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.59 0.49 0.29 4.19 0.45 6.06 1.29
2015 17 0.06 0.09 0.23 0.05 0.53 0.35 0.65 5.47 0.35 7.86 1.12
2016 20 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.55 0.45 0.25 5.38 0.35 7.22 1.67
Mean 25 0.01 -0.04 0.09 -0.05 0.60 0.51 0.32 4.06 0.39 6.25 1.46
Table 5 shows the correlation matrix of all variables utilized. Vatcheva et al. (2016) argue that in
the literature, the most common cut-off point for multicollinearity is 0.8, a threshold which all
the variables lie within. However, ln(DV ) and ln(TA) are closely correlated at 0.78. Salvi et al.
(2018) also find that ln(DV ) and ln(TA) are among the mostly correlated variables.
Table 5: Correlation matrix
∆ROA ∆ROE ∆ROS ∆ROCE NA SS CC ln(DV) Cash ln(TA) Lev
∆ROA 1
∆ROE 0.63 1
∆ROS 0.38 0.31 1
∆ROCE 0.49 0.63 0.27 1
NA 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.05 1
SS −0.10 −0.05 −0.06 0.04 0.05 1
CC 0.01 0.05 0.10 0.05 −0.30 −0.02 1
ln(DV) −0.13 0.004 −0.23 0.02 −0.08 0.18 0.13 1
Cash −0.18 −0.08 −0.15 −0.08 −0.09 0.10 0.24 0.08 1
ln(TA) −0.25 −0.04 −0.30 0.05 −0.18 0.15 0.17 0.78 0.19 1
Lev −0.04 0.05 −0.04 0.11 −0.09 0.08 −0.04 0.22 −0.06 0.33 1
Subsequently, I conduct a Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test to make sure that my dataset is not
affected by multicollinearity (shown in Table 6). All values from the VIF test are less than 3, and
thus comfortably within the thresholds suggested by Vatcheva et al. (2016) of 5 and 10. On the
basis of this, I conclude that significant multicollinearity is not present in my sample.
Results from the sample show statistically significant changes in average returns for ROE, ROS
and ROCE at a 1% level (see Table 7), while the change in ROA is not statistically significant.
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Table 6: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test
Variable VIF Variable VIF
NA 1.14 SS 1.05
CC 1.18 ln(DV ) 2.63
Cash 1.13 ln(TA) 2.96
Lev 1.16 Mean VIF 1.61
As mentioned earlier, the results are conflicting; the change in ROS is positive, while the changes
in ROE and ROCE are negative. This indicates that acquirers in my sample which bought a green
company may have been able to improve their operational margins (ROS), but this has not trickled
down to the debt and equity holders, which have ended up with negative changes in returns (ROE
and ROCE). This is despite the fact that researchers have found that environmentally-focused
firms are able to reduce their cost of capital (e.g. Sharfman and Fernando, 2008, and Ng et al.,
2015), suggesting that the acquirers in my sample might have paid too high a premium in the
transactions; something Salvi et al. (2018) argue is common in green M&A deals.
Further, the average change in ROA is not statistically different from zero. This may appear to
contradict the positive change in ROA found by Salvi et al. (2018), but they compared green
mega-deals with non-green mega-deals. The latter has been well documented to destroy value
for bidders, according to Hu et al. (2020). As such, it is plausible that green M&As perform
better than non-green deals (Salvi et al., 2018)− despite not creating value for bidders in the first
place. My sample indicates that this is the case, and as such I cannot confirm my first hypothesis
that acquirers buying green firms exhibit positive changes in accounting-based performance
measures (H1). This conclusion is based on a Student t test conducted on the changes in returns.
These results, as wells as those for the two sub-samples, are robust provided that the data is not
extremely non-normal, or the sample size is large (Keller, 2012). With a sample of 423 deals,
and from the histograms depicted in Appendix A2, I would argue this is the case here.
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Table 7: Average returns and t statistics
Sample ∆ROA ∆ROE ∆ROS ∆ROCE
Whole sample 0.007 (0.904) −0.039∗∗∗ (-2.716) 0.093∗∗∗ (5.448) −0.050∗∗∗ (-3.557)
North America (1) 0.017 (1.462) −0.019 (-0.986) 0.098∗∗∗ (4.313) −0.039∗∗ (-2.012)
Europe (2) −0.001 (-0.640) −0.068∗∗∗ (-3.392) 0.087∗∗∗ (3.319) −0.067∗∗∗ (-3.337)
Difference (1 - 2) 0.018 (1.506) 0.049∗ (1.735) 0.011 (0.326) 0.028 (1.020)
Note ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01 (two-tailed test)
In order to look more closely at the differences between deals completed in North America and
Europe, I divide my data into two sub-samples; one for each region. The results in Table 7 show
that returns from sub-sample 1 (North America) outperform those from sub-sample 2 (Europe)
in all regards. However, none of the differences are statistically significant at a 5% level.
To address the fact that the normality requirement may be in doubt in this case, I also conduct
a non-parametric test to compare the two samples; the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum Test, as
suggested by Keller (2012). This test yields p values well above any reasonable cut-off point, and
thus the null hypothesis of equal means between North America and Europe cannot be rejected.
Basic tests are not able to provide statistically significant evidence of any differences between the
two continents. To investigate further if there are any differences between the changes in post-
acquisition performance for acquirers buying green companies in North America and Europe,
I conduct a cross-sectional OLS regression analysis (see Table 8). According to Thanos and
Papadakis (2010), most of the existing research suggests to compare returns before the acquisition
with returns after, where the changes in the dependent variables can be caused by changes in
both the numerator and the denominator. My analysis is conducted this way, in accordance with
Salvi et al. (2018). Breusch-Pagan tests confirm the presence of heteroskedasticity in my dataset,
and thus White-Huber heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors and heteroskedasticity-robust
Wald F statistics are presented in the regression results (Wooldridge, 2013).
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Table 8: Regression results
Dependent variable:
∆ROA ∆ROE ∆ROS ∆ROCE
NA 0.01 (0.02) 0.06∗∗ (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) 0.05 (0.03)
SS -0.02 (0.02) -0.03 (0.03) 0.001 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
CC 0.03∗∗ (0.02) 0.07∗∗ (0.03) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.06∗∗ (0.03)
ln(DV ) 0.01∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Cash -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.05∗ (0.03) -0.09∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.06∗∗ (0.03)
ln(TA) -0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Lev 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Constant 0.10∗∗∗ (0.04) -0.06 (0.05) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.07) -0.14∗∗ (0.07)
Observations 423 423 423 423
R2 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.03
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.01 0.12 0.02
Residual Std. Er. (df = 415) 0.16 0.29 0.33 0.29
F Statistic (df = 7; 415) 6.66∗∗∗ 1.82∗ 8.91∗∗∗ 2.06∗∗
Notea: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Noteb: Standard errors and F statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity
As Table 8 shows, NA is associated with a positive change in returns for all regressions. However,
with the exception of the regression for ∆ROE, this is not statistically significant for any of the
dependent variables. In addition, the regression for ∆ROE has a low F statistic of 1.82, which
is only significant at a 10% level. This means that at a significance level of 5%, I cannot reject
the null hypothesis that all variables are jointly insignificant (Wooldridge, 2013). The adjusted
R-squares are also very low for ∆ROE and ∆ROCE, but in line with Salvi et al. (2018) for ∆ROA
and ∆ROS. However, Shalizi (2015) argues against using R-squared as it "does not measure
goodness of fit" and "can be arbitrarily low when the model is completely correct".
Measured by the change in returns from one year before the transaction to three years after, my
sample does not indicate that there is a statistically significant difference in performance for
acquirers that are buying green firms in North America and Europe, in line with the previous
statistical tests. The same can be said for acquirers operating in the same sector as their targets,
as the variable SS is also not significant for any regressions. This contradicts the results of
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Basse-Mama et al. (2013) and Yoo et al. (2013), who, using the event study methodology, find
that homogeneous firms have better post-acquisition performance than heterogeneous firms when
buying renewable companies. As such, my sample indicates that the positive results investors
expect in homogeneous deals relative to heterogeneous deals, are not manifesting themselves in
realized accounting returns. This can be explained by my requirement that the deal value needs
to be a minimum of 1% of the acquirer’s market capitalization. This ensures that the deal is
material to the buyer (Hu et al., 2020), thus effectively removing any attempts of "greenwashing";
something Basse-Mama et al. (2013) and Yoo et al. (2013) argue is penalized by the market
and may explain why they find that heterogeneous firms underperform homogeneous ones in
renewable M&As without such a requirement relating deal value to the acquirer’s size.
As mentioned in Chapter 2.4, premiums paid in cross-boarder deals are higher than in domestic
deals (Mateev and Andonov, 2017). Based on the transactions in my sample, acquirers are getting
value for their money as the variable CC is associated with a positive change in returns that is
significant at a 5% level for all the dependent variables. Acquirers buying green targets outside
their home-country have, all else equal, on average realized 3 percentage points, 7 percentage
points , 14 percentage points and 6 percentage points higher changes in ∆ROA, ∆ROE, ∆ROS
and ∆ROCE, respectively, relative to domestic transactions.
The same cannot be said for acquirers who pay purely in cash. My sample indicates that paying
solely in cash is associated with negative changes in returns at various levels of statistical
significance. Acquirers paying purely in cash in green M&As have, all else equal, on average
realized 4 percentage points, 5 percentage points , 9 percentage points and 6 percentage points
lower changes in ∆ROA, ∆ROE, ∆ROS and ∆ROCE, respectively, relative to those using other
payment methods. This contradicts the findings of Heron and Lie (2002), who conclude that
paying solely in cash in M&A deals does not affect the stock returns for acquirers, albeit using a
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sample of transactions from 1985 to 1997, which is not really comparable with my data set.
The regressions in Table 8 assume that the marginal effects of the dummy variables are equal
for deals in North America and Europe. The regressions also assume that the effect of the
target being incorporated in North America is equal for all states of the other dummy variables.
However, in order to investigate whether or not this is actually the case and to gain a deeper
understanding of how the independent variable NA interacts with the dummy variables SS and
CC, I also conduct cross-sectional OLS analyses using interaction variables. As with the previous
regressions in Table 8, I run a VIF test and draw a correlation matrix to check for multicollinearity
(see Appendix A3). The results remain the same (no multicollinearity), as all VIF values remain
comfortably within the suggested limits of 5 and 10 (Vatcheva et al., 2016).
"NA*SS" is an interaction variable comprised of NA and SS. NA*SS is interpreted as a dummy
variables that takes the value of 1 if the target is incorporated in North America and is registered
in the same Industry Group as its acquirer, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, "NA*CC" is an interaction
variable comprised of NA and CC. NA*CC is interpreted as a dummy variables that takes the
value of 1 if the target is incorporated in North America and in a different country than its
acquirer, and 0 otherwise. Table 9 and Table 10 depict the results of separately including the
interaction variables NA*SS and NA*CC, respectively.
Including the interaction between NA and SS (see Table 9) results in the variable NA now being
statistically significant at a 5% level for ∆ROA, and at a 10% level for ∆ROE and ∆ROCE. The
variable SS is still not statistically significant for any of the regressions. CC remains positive and
statistically significant at a 5% level for all regressions with the coefficients virtually unchanged.
It should be noted that the regression for ∆ROE now has an F statistic that is not significant at a
10% level, and thus I am unable to rule out that all variables are jointly statistically insignificant.
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Table 9: Regression results with NA*SS
Dependent variable:
∆ROA ∆ROE ∆ROS ∆ROCE
NA 0.05∗∗ (0.02) 0.08∗ (0.04) 0.01 (0.05) 0.08∗ (0.04)
SS 0.02 (0.02) -0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05) 0.06 (0.04)
CC 0.04∗∗ (0.02) 0.07∗∗ (0.03) 0.14∗∗∗ (0.04) 0.06∗∗ (0.03)
NA*SS -0.07∗∗ (0.03) -0.03 (0.06) -0.01 (0.06) -0.06 (0.06)
ln(DV) 0.01∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.001 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Cash -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.05∗ (0.03) -0.09∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.06∗∗ (0.02)
ln(TA) -0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Lev 0.004 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Constant 0.08∗∗ (0.03) -0.07 (0.05) 0.33∗∗∗ (0.07) -0.15∗∗ (0.07)
Observations 423 423 423 423
R2 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.04
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.02
Residual Std. Er. (df = 414) 0.16 0.29 0.33 0.29
F Statistic (df = 8; 414) 6.52∗∗∗ 1.63 7.78∗∗∗ 1.96∗∗
Notea: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Noteb: Standard errors and F statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity
The interaction variable NA*SS is negative for all regressions, and only significant in the
regression for ∆ROA. However, Brambor et al. (2006) show how it is perfectly possible for the
marginal effects of an independent variable to be significant for relevant values of the interaction
variables, even though the coefficients on the interaction terms are insignificant. Such values for
the interaction variables can be found using the Johnson-Neyman procedure (D’Alonzo, 2004).
For NA*SS in the regressions for ∆ROA and ∆ROCE, the Johnson-Neyman procedure yields
intervals that contain the value 0, but not 1, for a p value of 5%. This means that the independent
variable NA is significant at a 5% level for the regressions for ∆ROA and ∆ROCE when the
interaction variables equal 0, but not when they equal 1. So when the target and the acquirer are
not in the same sector (SS = 0), NA is significant at a 5% level and associated with effects of 0.05
and 0.08 for ∆ROA and ∆ROCE, respectively. SS equals 0 for 206 deals in my sample, equalling
49% of the total. This leaves a large number of observations in which heterogeneous acquirers
have realized on average a 5 percentage point and 8 percentage point higher change in ROA and
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ROCE, respectively, when buying a green company in North America relative to Europe, all else
equal. Based on these observations, the higher premiums paid in deals in North America relative
to Europe (Renneboog, 2006) are paying off for acquirers in heterogeneous, green M&As.
Subsequently, I complete the same exercise with NA*CC (see Table 10). NA remains insignificant
for ∆ROS and this is now also the case for ∆ROA, suggesting that the positive cross-boarder
effects found by Mateev and Andonov (2017) trump any continental-specific differences between
North America and Europe. Further, the F statistic for ∆ROE is still low, and only significant at a
10% level. Hence, I cannot place too much emphasis on the results from this regression.
Table 10: Regression results with NA*CC
Dependent variable:
∆ROA ∆ROE ∆ROS ∆ROCE
NA 0.02 (0.02) 0.09∗∗ (0.04) 0.02 (0.04) 0.08∗ (0.04)
SS -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) 0.002 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03)
CC 0.04∗ (0.02) 0.11∗∗ (0.04) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.10∗∗ (0.04)
NA*CC -0.01 (0.03) -0.08 (0.06) -0.04 (0.08) -0.08 (0.06)
ln(DV) 0.01∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Cash -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.05∗ (0.03) -0.09∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.07∗∗∗ (0.03)
ln(TA) -0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Lev 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Constant 0.10∗∗∗ (0.04) -0.08 (0.06) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.07) -0.16∗∗ (0.07)
Observations 423 423 423 423
R2 0.10 0.03 0.13 0.04
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.01 0.11 0.02
Residual Std. Er. (df = 414) 0.16 0.29 0.33 0.29
F Statistic (df = 8; 414) 5.83∗∗∗ 1.79∗ 7.82∗∗∗ 2.01∗∗
Notea: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Noteb: Standard errors and F statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity
When the cross-boarder effects are removed (CC = 0), NA reflects changes in returns for North
American acquirers relative to European ones, and is significant at a 5% level for ∆ROCE,
confirmed by the Johnson-Neyman procedure. There are 286 such observations in my sample,
corresponding to 68% of the total. In other words, when the target and the acquirer are
incorporated in the same country, acquirers of green firms in North America have on average
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realized an 8 percentage point higher change in ROCE than in Europe, all else equal. This
result for ∆ROCE remains consistent with Table 9, and can be explained by the fact that North
American companies have lower average ESG scores that European ones (Nordea Markets,
2018). North American firms will in turn have more to gain from acquiring a green company,
provided that acquiring a green company yields positive results in the first place, which, among
others, Eisenbach et al. (2011) and Yoo et al. (2013) find to be the case.
Further, I conduct a cross-sectional OLS analysis that includes both the interaction variables
NA*SS and NA*CC (see Table 11). This results in the variable NA being statistically significant
at a 5% level for ∆ROA, ∆ROE and ∆ROCE. The variable SS is still not statistically significant
for any of the regressions, while CC remains positive and statistically significant at various levels
for all regressions. It should again be noted that the regression for ∆ROE now has an F statistic
that is not significant at a 10% level, and thus I cannot rule out that all variables are jointly
statistically insignificant for this particular regression.
Table 11: Regression results with NA*SS and NA*CC
Dependent variable:
∆ROA ∆ROE ∆ROS ∆ROCE
NA 0.06∗∗ (0.03) 0.11∗∗ (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.11∗∗ (0.05)
SS 0.02 (0.02) -0.004 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05) 0.06 (0.04)
CC 0.04∗ (0.02) 0.11∗∗ (0.04) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.10∗∗ (0.04)
NA*SS -0.07∗∗ (0.03) -0.03 (0.06) -0.01 (0.06) -0.07 (0.06)
NA*CC -0.01 (0.03) -0.08 (0.06) -0.04 (0.08) -0.08 (0.06)
ln(DV) 0.01∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Cash -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.05∗ (0.03) -0.09∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.06∗∗∗ (0.03)
ln(TA) -0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Lev 0.005 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Constant 0.08∗∗ (0.04) -0.09 (0.06) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.07) -0.18∗∗ (0.07)
Observations 423 423 423 423
R2 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.04
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.02
Residual Std. Er. (df = 413) 0.16 0.29 0.33 0.29
F Statistic (df = 9; 413) 5.80∗∗∗ 1.63 6.94∗∗∗ 1.93∗∗
Notea: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Noteb: Standard errors and F statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity
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All the interaction variables are negative, and none are statistically significant at any level, with
the exception of NA*SS in the regression for ∆ROA. For the regressions for ∆ROA and ∆ROCE,
the Johnson-Neyman procedure yields intervals that contain the value 0, but not 1, for a p value
of 5%. More precisely, the coefficients on NA are positive and statistically significant at a
5% level for ∆ROA and ∆ROCE, but this only applies in the situation when the transaction is
between companies in different industries (SS = 0) that are incorporated in the same country (CC
= 0). My sample has 137 such observations (32% of the total sample). In the aforementioned
scenario, acquirers buying a green target incorporated in North America have, all else equal, on
average realized a 6 percentage point and 11 percentage point higher change in ROA and ROCE,
respectively, relative to Europe. This is consistent with the results from Table 9 and Table 10.
Lastly, I conduct a cross-sectional OLS analysis which includes a triple interaction term for
"NA*SS*CC" (see Table 12). NA*SS*CC is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the
target is incorporated in North America and is registered in the same Industry Group as its
acquirer and incorporated in a different country than its acquirer, and 0 otherwise. Including
NA*SS*CC hardly effects the coefficients, standard errors or the interpretation of the regression
results − with the obvious exception that the variable NA appears to narrowly drop from a
5% significance level to a 10% significance level for ∆ROA, ∆ROE and ∆ROCE. However, the
Johnson-Neyman procedure still confirms that when SS = 0 and CC = 0, the variable NA is
significant at a 5% level for ∆ROA and ∆ROCE with coefficients of 0.05 and 0.10, respectively.
This means that yet another OLS analysis indicates positive effects for heterogeneous companies
acquiring green firms domestically in North America relative to Europe, underpinning the
findings from the previous analyses. In this case, buyers in green M&A transactions have, all
else equal, on average realized a 5 percentage point and 10 percentage point higher change in
ROA and ROCE, respectively, when acquiring targets in North America relative to Europe. The
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Table 12: Regression results with NA*SS, NA*CC and NA*SS*CC
Dependent variable:
∆ROA ∆ROE ∆ROS ∆ROCE
NA 0.05∗ (0.03) 0.11∗ (0.05) 0.03 (0.05) 0.10∗ (0.06)
SS 0.02 (0.02) -0.004 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05) 0.06 (0.04)
CC 0.04∗ (0.02) 0.11∗∗ (0.04) 0.16∗∗∗ (0.05) 0.10∗∗ (0.04)
NA*SS -0.07∗∗ (0.03) -0.03 (0.06) -0.02 (0.07) -0.04 (0.06)
NA*CC -0.01 (0.04) -0.07 (0.08) -0.07 (0.09) -0.02 (0.08)
NA*SS*CC -0.001 (0.05) -0.03 (0.08) 0.06 (0.11) -0.12 (0.09)
ln(DV) 0.01∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.002 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01)
Cash -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.05∗ (0.03) -0.09∗∗∗ (0.03) -0.06∗∗ (0.03)
ln(TA) -0.02∗∗∗ (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) -0.04∗∗∗ (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Lev 0.004 (0.01) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)
Constant 0.08∗∗ (0.04) -0.09 (0.06) 0.32∗∗∗ (0.07) -0.18∗∗ (0.07)
Observations 423 423 423 423
R2 0.11 0.03 0.13 0.04
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.01 0.11 0.02
Residual Std. Er. (df = 412) 0.16 0.29 0.33 0.29
F Statistic (df = 10; 412) 5.21∗∗∗ 1.47 6.27∗∗∗ 1.91∗∗
Notea: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Noteb: Standard errors and F statistics are robust to heteroskedasticity
F statistic for ∆ROE remains insignificant and too low to ascribe this particular regression any
significant meaning, and NA is still not significant for ∆ROS.
Basse-Mama et al. (2013) and Yoo et al. (2013) find that homogeneous firms perform better than
heterogeneous firms in green M&A transactions. They argue that this is because the operational
synergies homogeneous firms can gain outweigh the diversification effects heterogeneous firms
can achieve. As discussed in Chapter 2.4, the focus on CSR and ESG is more advanced in Europe
compared to North America (Doh and Guay, 2006). This means European firms on average are
more focused on ESG, and would likely have more operational synergies to offer than a green
target in North America. This in turn may explain why my sample indicates no statistically
significant effects for targets incorporated in North America in the regressions for ∆ROS.
The positive effects of acquiring a green company in a different country (CC = 1) remain
throughout all the OLS analyses, which is to be expected as acquirers are willing to consistently
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pay higher premiums in cross-boarder transactions (Mateev and Andonov, 2017). The positive
effects of cross-boarder transactions appear to trump any differences between North America
and Europe, as NA remains insignificant when CC equals 1. When excluding this effect (CC =
0), my sample indicates that heterogeneous (SS = 0) buyers acquiring green targets have, all else
equal, on average realized a 5 percentage point and 10 percentage point higher change in ROA
and ROCE, respectively, in North America relative to Europe (see Table 12).
The focus for heterogeneous firms is on diversification, something North American firms with
lower ESG scores (Nordea Markets, 2018) can achieve more of. As North American companies
underperform European ones with respect to average ESG scores, this also means North American
firms have the most potential for improvement, starting from a lower relative level. Once
the dominating cross-boarder effect is excluded, it follows that the average non-green North
American company has more to gain in terms of buying a green company domestically, than
a non-green European company would. My sample indicates that this is the case, which is
corroborated by previous research suggesting that buying a green company results in improved
performance in the first place (e.g. Eisenbach et al., 2011, and Yoo et al., 2013).
Summarized, my sample indicates that buying a green company in North America is more
beneficial than in Europe, all else equal, but this is only statistically significant at a 5% level for
∆ROA and ∆ROCE when excluding the effects of the target being registered in the same Industry
Group as its acquirer, and incorporated in a different country. Further, I find contradicting
evidence when comparing these results with those from ∆ROE and ∆ROS. There is no significant
effect of NA in the regressions for ∆ROS, suggesting that the target’s geographical location does
not affect changes in operational margins. In addition, the F statistics for ∆ROE are too low to
be assigned any conclusions. As such, I cannot confirm my second hypothesis that acquirers in
green M&As perform better when buying targets in North America relative to Europe (H2).
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7 Conclusion
Throughout this thesis, I examine the effects on acquirers’ post-acquisition performance when
buying a green company. My first hypothesis is that acquirers buying green firms will exhibit
a positive change in performance based on accounting-based measures (H1), in line with the
findings of previous research. Eisenbach et al., 2011, Basse-Mama et al., 2013, and Yoo et
al., 2013, study the effects of buying green companies using the event-study methodology, and
conclude that acquiring environmentally-focused firms yields positive results.
However, my sample indicates mixed findings. The average change in ROS from one year
before the acquisition to three years after is positive (0.093) and statistically significant at a 1%
level. According to Cording et al. (2010), ROS reflects operational performance and synergies
that may arise from an acquisition. The M&A deals I examine thus indicate that acquiring a
green company improves operating margins for the bidders. But the average changes in ROE
and ROCE are negative (−0.039 and −0.050, respectively), and statistically significant at a
1% level. This in turn suggests that whatever operational improvements acquirers may be able
to accomplish are not benefiting shareholders and debtholders. This is surprising, as several
researchers find a clear relationship between an increased environmental focus and a lower cost
of capital (e.g. Sharfman and Fernando, 2008, and Ng and Rezaee, 2015), and can in turn suggest
that acquirers are overpaying for the green targets in my sample. Aggarwal and Garg (2019)
argue that unless a transaction leads to an improved profitability position for the firm, it cannot
be deemed a success. As such, I cannot confirm my first hypothesis that acquirers buying green
companies exhibit a positive change in performance based on accounting-based measures.
I also highlight the differences between the change in acquirers’ returns based on if they purchase
a company in North America or Europe, under the second hypothesis that the positive change
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in performance will be larger for bidders that are buying a target in North America relative to
Europe (H2). Basic statistical tests do not allow me to reject any null hypotheses of equal means
between the two continents. However, using cross-sectional OLS analyses with interaction
variables yields some significant results. The coefficients for NA in the regressions ∆ROA and
∆ROCE are positive (0.05 and 0.10, respectively − see Table 12). These findings are statistically
significant at a 5% level when the dummy variables SS and CC equal 0. When the same dummy
variables equal 1, the results are still positive, but not significant at a 5% level.
It should be noted that the F statistics for ∆ROE are not significant, so the results from these
regressions must not be overemphasized. Further, the variable NA is not significant in the
regressions for ∆ROS, and only significant for ∆ROA and ∆ROCE in certain situations. As such,
I cannot confirm my second hypothesis that the change in performance will be more positive for
acquirers buying targets in North America rather than Europe. However, my findings do suggest
that even though acquirers are forced to pay higher transaction premiums in North America
compared to Europe (Renneboog, 2006), they are mostly getting value for their money when
they buy green companies across the pond − it is just not statistically significant in all instances.
Assessing my study reveals certain weaknesses that may have impacted the results. First,
I base my performance measures on accounting information. Financial ratios calculated
from accounting numbers are affected by several factors, not all of which are related to the
acquisition I wish to measure. In addition, accounting figures can be manipulate by management
(Chakravarthy, 1986). Second, I only use one time-period (change from one year before the
acquisition to three years after). This is the most common practice in the literature (Cording et
al., 2010) and in line with Salvi et al. (2018). However, Morosini et al. (1998) argue that a time
frame of two years should be utilized1, as this is the most critical period after a merger and is
1My findings remain intact for a 2-year period, but with less statistical significance
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usually sufficient to complete the integration process.
Third, there may be issues related to the methodology and treatment of data. A potential problem
is that of omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2013). This occurs when a relevant, explanatory
variable is omitted from the regression model. While I use the same variables as Salvi et al.
(2018) and conduct successful Ramsey RESET tests, there are no guarantees that I have not left
out any relevant variables. Further, I winsorize the data to [2.5% , 97.5%], in line with what is
common practice (Adams et al., 2018). However, Heckman (1979) argues that trimming and
dropping variables can introduce sample selection problems and biased coefficient estimates.
For further research, it would be interesting to look at a similar topic, but for the performance of
target companies. However, this would in many cases require access to private data which is more
difficult to get a hold of. It would also be useful to conduct a similar analysis that includes deals
in Asia, as an increasing number of green M&As are taking place there. Further, my methodology
could be improved, or changed, to include more appropriate variables in an attempt to better
explain the relationship between acquiring green companies and post-acquisition performance.
Lastly, while the financial synergies involved in green M&A transactions have been researched
in detail (e.g. Sharfman and Fernando, 2008, Ghoul et al., 2011, and Ng and Rezaee, 2015),
operational synergies in green M&A deals have, as far as I know, not been investigated explicitly.
This is an interesting topic to look at in more detail; one which I leave for future research.
Summarized, I do not find statistically significant evidence that acquiring green firms create
value for bidders measured by the change in accounting ratios from one year before the deal to
three years after. Further, my sample indicates that acquiring a green target in North America is
more beneficial than Europe, but this is only statistically significant in certain scenarios and not
definitive. Hence, it appears value creation from M&As is more complex than simply buying a
green firm in North America− and instead comes down to deal and firm-specific characteristics.
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A1 Industry keywords applied to source for "green" deals
The following 60 keywords are applied as a text search in SDC Platinum to source for "green"
deals, as suggested by Zephyr (2013).
Table A1: Industry keywords
ALTERNATIVE ENERGY ALTERNATIVE POWER BIOMASS
BIOENERGY BIO ENERGY BIO-ENERGY
BIOFUEL FUEL CELL HYDROGEN
PHOTOVOLTAIC RENEWABLE ENERGY REUSABLE ENERGY
RE-USABLE ENERGY SOLAR WASTE TO ENERGY
WIND POWER WIND FARM WAVE POWER
GEOTHERMAL GEO-THERMAL HYDROPOWER
HYDRO-POWER BIO-DIESEL BIODIESEL
ENERGY RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ELECTRIC VEHICLE WATER PURIFICATION
INTELLIGENT POWER AIR QUALITY ENERGY EFFICIENCY
ENERGY EFFICIENCY SOFTWARE THIN FILM ENERGY THIN-FILM ENERGY
ENERGY STORAGE BATTERY POWER WATER TREATMENT
WASTE MANAGEMENT BIOGAS ANAEROBIC DIGESTION
WASTEWATER GREEN CONSTRUCTION GREEN BUILDINGS
SMART METER SMART GRID ENERGY MONITORING
MARINE ENERGY SOLAR THERMAL ALGAE
GREEN ENERGY CLEANTECH CLEAN TECH
ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY GREENTECH CHARGING STATIONS
GREEN INFRASTRUCTURES CLEAN ENERGY TIDAL ENERGY
TIDAL POWER BIODEGRADABLE ALTERNATIVE FUEL
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A2 Histograms of returns
A3 VIF test and correlation matrix for interaction variables
Table A3.1: Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test
Variable VIF Variable VIF
NA 2.94 SS 2.57
CC 2.36 NA*SS 4.04
NA*CC 3.58 NA*SS*CC 2.60
ln(DV ) 2.67 Cash 1.14
ln(TA) 2.98 Lev 1.17
Mean VIF 2.41
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Table A3.2: Correlation matrix
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